Shrinking maritime dominance threatens the foundation of US grand strategy

“He who controls the sea controls trade, and he who controls the world’s trade controls the world’s wealth, and thus the world itself.” This saying, coined by the English adventurer and writer, Walter Raleigh, who lived in the 16th century, and promoted by the contemporary strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, has always formed the basis of the grand strategy of the United States.

For decades, America has relied on its overwhelming naval power to maintain its military dominance, ensure the security of global trade, and maintain the rules-based international order, but that era is coming to an end.

Although US naval power has in the past faced few significant constraints, its scope of dominance has been significantly diminished. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the most dramatic example of this change, as it indicates that the United States can no longer guarantee freedom of navigation, even in the face of weaker adversaries, through some of the world’s narrowest sea lanes, where geography and the proliferation of cheap weapons put even powerful fleets at a disadvantage. The “Strait of Hormuz” is characterized by the lack of maritime alternatives to it, but it is not the only place where the United States’ ability to guarantee unconditional security for maritime trade has faced challenges. Directly to the west, the Houthis kept the “Bab al-Mandab Strait” closed to most traffic throughout 2024, at a time when Russia and China guaranteed safe passage for their ships, despite the American military campaign aimed at weakening the Houthis. At the same time, the rapid expansion of the Chinese Navy and its massive shipbuilding capacity have made uncontested US naval dominance increasingly unsustainable, even outside the world’s vital sea lanes. The United States maintains clear advantages on the high seas, but its freedom of maneuver is now limited even in territorial waters, especially in parts of East Asia and the Arctic, where, in the event of an emergency, American warships can be prevented from approaching the opponent’s coasts with powerful anti-ship missiles or underwater missiles.

For many in Washington, the end of guaranteed freedom of navigation is an unacceptable prospect. However, while these changes pose new economic and military challenges, they do not pose an existential threat to US security or core interests. The United States can adapt and even thrive in a more competitive maritime environment by expanding regional economic networks, investing in resilient supply chains, and shifting greater maritime responsibility to allies and partners.

Achieving sovereignty

Washington has long sought to achieve “maritime sovereignty” for three main reasons. First, maritime dominance and the ability of the United States to project its military power globally are seen as essential to national defense and the protection of national interests. Second: The ability to ensure freedom of navigation for maritime trade around the world is a basic condition for a stable global trading system, while the third reason is the belief of many in Washington that safe and open seas constitute a basic pillar of a peaceful international order.

However, losing naval superiority does not necessarily mean losing these advantages, and as political scientist Barry Posen says, to ensure their physical and economic security, countries only need sufficient naval power to impose temporary control over major sea lanes to access vital economic markets, or to transfer military assets.

Within this more modest scope, the United States can still manage the maritime domain, and intervene directly by force when necessary to defend core interests. But in all other cases, Washington should hand over responsibility for maritime security to local actors and to those most dependent on certain sea lanes.

Sufficient naval power

The United States today has more than enough naval power to achieve this goal, and more importantly, although the US Navy is no longer as dominant as it once was, it still has sufficient ability to extend its influence to serve basic military or commercial activities, and can reliably establish temporary control over territorial waters away from American territory when needed. Its blockade of Iranian ports, although of questionable strategic value, is evidence of this ability. Maintaining the ability to conduct these types of activities is in the United States’ interest, as is ensuring unimpeded access to water throughout the Western Hemisphere. But the United States can achieve this standard even if it accepts its position as one of the great maritime powers and abandons its role as guarantor of global freedom of navigation.

Temporary access

When the Houthis targeted the Bab al-Mandab Strait, although the United States was not able to have absolute control over the strait, its warships were still able to use the strait and conduct limited transfer operations, because they were able to defend against drones and missiles.

In other words, it could have guaranteed “temporary access” to conduct its operations, so the US Navy would likely be able to do the same in the Strait of Hormuz.

Its failure to attempt to open the Strait by force is likely a reflection of the limited U.S. interests at stake: Americans have been largely protected from the devastating effects the world faced and the relatively high costs of such a move, not a lack of requisite capabilities.

Even without the use of military force, the United States’ favorable geography allows it to adapt to maritime disturbances very quickly. With its long coastline on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States can generally access major markets from multiple directions, and as Arctic ice declines, northern sea routes may provide additional options for trade with Europe and elsewhere. About “Foreign Policy”

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Fears of piracy and ship detention

Some say that a more competitive maritime system will lead to increased risks of conflict and economic disruption, undermining US security and prosperity, as well as global stability. They fear that in the future, countries on key sea lanes will gain influence that allows them to hold ships hostage, or impose fees that increase the cost of doing business. But a return to more competition on the high seas would only be a return to historical normalcy.

However, there is little evidence that this change will inevitably lead to global instability or the end of the peaceful international order, and if the United States withdraws from its role as a guarantor of freedom of navigation, other countries are likely to intervene to protect their own interests and prevent the emergence of new threats and conflicts on the high seas, or the return of old threats, such as piracy.