American policies that failed Russia’s orientation towards a European style democracy

It is quite clear that Russia is testing NATO through attacks by “drones”, and on the Roman border. Russia seeks to achieve interests that directly contradict the interests of the United States, NATO, Ukraine and the liberal world order.

The 1990s witnessed a short period when it seemed that Russia was heading towards democracy in the European style, after it participated in the efforts to establish democracy in Russia at the time.

But why did Russia, under the leadership of the late President Boris Yeltsin, and the liberal reformists, and replace them with current President Vladimir Putin? What role did the United States and other Western governments play?

I recently met with a former American diplomat who served in two rounds in Moscow, Wayne Miri, who in 1994 wrote a lengthy letter entitled “The Opposition Channel”, and in his message raised questions about the approach that our government followed, the message was revealed about six months ago, and published by the National Security Archives.

Miri argues that Russia was not eligible for a fundamental reform of its international economy, and Miri expected that the popular reaction would undermine the Yeltsin government and cause great harm to the future American -Russian relations.

Given the collapse of the Soviet economy, the Russian transition was expected to be chaotic, but Miri criticized the focus of American policy on market reforms instead of building democratic institutions.

It was clear in 1994 that the Russian people were looking for a scapegoat, and the reformists with the help of US consultants deal with a Soviet economy collapsed before Yeltsin and their government -ranging government took a long time.

The economic approach centered around the state and the inherent distortions of Russia led to the bankruptcy of Russia, and it was the only solution that perhaps less painful for the ordinary Russian citizen was to pump huge resources comparable to the “Marshall Plan” after the Second World War. The high cost that Germany has spent over two decades to accommodate East Germany is another example, yet it was not possible that the United States or Europe could be ready to allocate a similar level of resources, but what could the United States could do differently?

In 1991, the director of the American Agency for International Development, Jim Norris, defended a strategic plan that defines priorities and defines the most needy Russian reformists, and was one of the most important elements of the plan to help the reformists build the democratic institutions needed to support the market economy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Coordinator took the initiative to draw policies, and believing that Russia is a developed society already opposed to developing a plan, and with the support of the Treasury, he wanted to focus on trade and investment, and told Congress that we will come out close to Russia.

Norris, a prominent economic expert, believes that Russia “has a few judicial structures and the necessary institutions necessary for natural commercial and investment relations.”

The American Agency for International Development lost this argument, and the Russian aid program in Washington became open to all, as almost all US government departments competed to participate.

The effort lacked the definition, and as Miri noted that he often ignored the local context, great efforts were made to meet the needs of the reformists, but the total effort lacked a strategic framework, and Yeltsin faced in 1995 elections at a time when opinion polls indicated that his popularity was “in the bottom”, and he felt that he was forced to abandon the reforms he undertakes.

Yeltsin underwent pressure and his government, ignoring external advice, and established a loan program for shares that enabled government companies to obtain huge amounts of stock certificates. The oligarchy, which was born before, reached the stage of maturity.

The year 1995 was the period when Putin moved from the city of Petersburg to Moscow, where he became very quickly the director of Federal Security Services, and then he became Prime Minister to Yeltsin in 1998, and left Yeltsin in the presidency of Russia in 1999.

There is always a tendency to skin when looking at these historical eras, and there is no doubt that our government committed errors, and we could invest more, but increasing resources was not an option, and we could be more strategic, focused and aware of the local context.

The risks are still great, and Miris and Noris, the experts familiar with the Foreign Ministry and the American International Development Agency, have no longer voted in the Trump administration, and the fate of Ukraine and the history of Europe may decide two men vulnerable to error. About “The Hill”

• Russia was not an institutionalized for a fundamental reform of its international economy.

*Brian Atwood

Researcher at the American “University of Brown” in international and public issues