The war in Ukraine is reshaping the weapons arsenal of Southeast Asian countries

For about two decades, the governments of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) were particularly interested in diversifying their weapons arsenal, balancing American fighters with Russian submarines, and French frigates with South Korean training aircraft.
By diversifying sources of defense supply among major powers, ASEAN has been able to modernize its defense capabilities without taking sides, thus maintaining the strategic independence that has long characterized the bloc’s stance toward great-power competition.
Russia was a linchpin in these arrangements, as Moscow provided aircraft, submarines, and advanced air defense systems at prices that Western suppliers could not match, and accepted unconventional payment arrangements, including bartering for palm oil and coffee, and in return asked few political questions.
But this arrangement has now collapsed, and its consequences go far beyond mere calculations in defense ministries. The Russian-Ukrainian war has achieved what years of Western pressure could not, as it has effectively eliminated Russia from its position as a major arms supplier to Southeast Asia, and pushed the region’s armies towards a defense system based on NATO standards.
This change was not planned or coordinated, but rather is simply the cumulative result of dozens of practical decisions related to procurement, which were taken in light of the risks of sanctions, the instability of supplies, and the high cost of operating equipment that cannot be linked to systems provided by other partner parties.
Russia’s share of new defense contracts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decreased from about 20% during the period from 2017 to 2021, to less than 3% during the period from 2022 to 2024. As for the shipments that are still arriving, most notably the Su-30 SME fighters to Myanmar, they are completing the implementation of contracts signed years ago, and orders to purchase new Russian weapons have almost disappeared.
Despite the expansion of China’s economic influence and its relentless pursuit of regional armies, it has not filled the void left by Russia in Southeast Asia, and compared to Western powers, its share of contracts during the same period is very small. Instead, suppliers from outside the three traditional powers: China, Russia, and the United States, including France, South Korea, Turkey, and India, now represent about 85% of the value of the region’s contracts.
The Philippines is a clear example of this. In November 2021, Manila signed a contract to purchase 16 Russian Mi-17 helicopters during the era of President Rodrigo Duterte, who publicly promoted this deal as part of a policy of rebalancing away from Washington.
Weeks after the first batch in January 2022, Russian tanks entered Ukrainian territory, turning the deal from a promising project into a sanctions trap.
The Philippine ambassador, Jose Manuel Romualdez, later acknowledged that concerns extended beyond the helicopter program itself, to include the potential exposure of Philippine banks and foreign remittances to secondary sanctions.
The administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., which took power in mid-2022, canceled the contract and moved to purchase S-70i Black Hawk helicopters, manufactured in Poland by PZL Mielec, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin. Washington also offered $100 million in foreign military financing to compensate for the cancellation of the deal. Instead of “rebalancing” the Philippines’ military purchases, the Philippine Air Force became increasingly integrated into logistical support networks. The Philippines, an ally of the United States, has long relied heavily on American weapons.
In contrast, the Vietnamese army was built around Russian platforms, from Su-30 fighters to Kilo submarines and S-300 air defense systems. In fact, Hanoi reduced its purchases of Russian weapons long before 2022, in part for two reasons. The first was the risk of sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, and the second was a domestic anti-corruption campaign that scrutinized In large defense contracts.
The Russian-Ukrainian war accelerated the process of gradual withdrawal, and obtaining Russian spare parts, software updates, and comprehensive maintenance operations became unguaranteed, which threatened the readiness of the most important Vietnamese military platforms. In response, Hanoi adopted local maintenance capabilities and strengthened cooperation with India in the field of submarine maintenance.
Vietnam turned to alternative suppliers and concluded a historic deal worth $245 million to purchase K-9 howitzers from South Korea. It also signed a new agreement to enhance cooperation in the field of defense industries with Turkey.
Vietnam is expected to officially sign a deal to purchase C-130 transport aircraft, at a time when Hanoi realizes that it can no longer rely on Russia to meet its defense needs.
As for Malaysia, it is located between the Philippines and Vietnam. It imports its weapons from various partners, an example of which is the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s arsenal, which includes seven American-made F-18 aircraft, 12 British-made BAE Hawk 200 aircraft, and 18 Russian Su-30 MKM fighters. It has become almost impossible to maintain Russian fighters in full operational readiness.
One of the Royal Malaysian Air Force pilots who flies Su-30 fighters admitted, during the 2024 Singapore Air Show, that sanctions were a major reason for the government’s search for alternatives to purchase its next fighters.
Malaysia has not removed its Russian aircraft from service, but it is directing its new spending towards different suppliers. In 2023, Malaysia signed agreements to purchase 18 FA-50 fighters from South Korea, and three Anka drones from Turkey.
The Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia are making individual choices consistent with their national interests, but the end result is that Southeast Asia is gradually converging on Western technical standards, and even if these deals are driven by short-term considerations, their effects will last for many years.
The geopolitical ramifications for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be worrying, as the bloc’s diplomatic identity was based on its ability to deal with all great powers without completely siding with any of them, a position that was based on maintaining real alternatives.
The collapse of the Russian option, combined with maritime tensions that make Chinese military equipment politically expensive for many ASEAN members, has narrowed the options available. Besides American arms offers, many alternative defense suppliers, such as France, Germany, South Korea, and Turkey, are allies of the United States.
Maritime Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore, are more deeply integrated into Western military structures, while mainland states, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, lean more toward China for reasons that preceded the Ukrainian conflict, but were strengthened by it.
This technological disparity reflects the same political gap that is evident in ASEAN’s repeated failures to reach consensus on the South China Sea statements, and the mixed reactions to the OCOs agreement.
The era of the ability of Southeast Asian countries to play the role of mediator between Moscow, Washington, and Beijing has ended, as it is still not entirely clear what will happen next, but the region is likely to witness more severe internal divisions, less space for deliberate neutrality, and a weaker ability to contain competition between the great powers. About “The Diplomat”.

• ASEAN countries were able to modernize their defense capabilities without siding with any party, thus preserving their strategic independence, which has always characterized the bloc’s position towards competition between great powers.

• The era of the ability of Southeast Asian countries to play the role of mediator between Moscow, Washington, and Beijing has ended, and it is still not entirely clear what will happen next, but the region is likely to witness more severe internal divisions, less room for deliberate neutrality, and a weaker ability to contain competition between the great powers.